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The French Overseas Territories in transition
Nathalie Mrgudovic
Introduction
France declared 2011 ‘Année des outre-mer’ (the Year of the Overseas) in 
recognition that each of the French Overseas Territories (or FOTs) had 
reached a milestone in its relations with France. Having passed from colonies 
(or protectorates) to French Overseas Territories or Overseas Départements in 
1946, they have evolved progressively at different speeds and degrees. If the 
initial changes suggested by the United Nations (UN) were mostly justified on 
political and ideological grounds (the right to independence, self-determination 
and sovereignty), the current changes, this time encouraged by France, in the 
main appear to be an attempt to alleviate economic dependency.
At the 2004 conference on the United Kingdom Overseas Territories 
(UKOTs), organised by and held at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies 
in London, I presented an analysis of the FOTs and the evolution of their 
statuses since the origins of this ‘Overseas France’.1 I will therefore give only 
a brief overview here of these territories and the main characteristics of their 
statuses in order to focus on the constitutional and institutional developments 
that took place, mostly in 2003 and 2008. I will also consider the statutory 
amendments adopted in July 2011 by the French Parliament to address the 
political instability that had recently emerged in two of the French territories in 
the South Pacific. Finally, in the light of these recent developments in the FOTs, 
I will question their institutional evolution. However, given the complexity of 
this subject, this chapter will simply sketch out the main points worthy of 
deeper reflection. 
Immediately after the Second World War, and in a context of 
decolonisation promoted by the UN, the four oldest French colonies 
1 See Mrgudovic, in Killingray and Taylor (2005), pp. 65–86.
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of Martinique, Guadeloupe, Guyane and la Réunion became, in 1946,2 
four Départements d’Outre-Mer (DOMs or Overseas Departments). Their 
status was characterised by a legislative regime identical (with some minor 
adaptations taking into account their remoteness and tropical island status 
or territory) to the one applied to the départements in mainland France. They 
were organised around a local council (Conseil Général) and municipalities, 
and a Préfet representing the State. The DOMs were all represented in the 
French Parliament by locally elected députés and sénateurs. However, this 
DOM status contained an intrinsic flaw, only addressed quite recently, in 
that identical status had been bestowed on the four overseas entities with 
no real attempt to adapt it to their own specificities and needs. Guyane, 
in particular, located between Brazil and Suriname and both covered and 
surrounded by rain forest, was the DOM that suffered most from this 
uniform status.3
A few months after the law on integration (loi de départementalisation) was 
passed, the Constitution of 1946, implementing the Fourth Republic, was 
adopted. In the rest of the French Empire, with some exceptions, the colonies 
were transformed into French Territoires d’Outre-mer (TOMs or Overseas 
Territories). However after 12 years of constant governmental instability, the 
Fourth Republic collapsed. A referendum was organised in September 1958 to 
adopt the new French Constitution that was to establish the Fifth Republic. 
The inhabitants of the TOMs (therefore excluding the four DOMs) could 
choose either to remain within the Republic or to become independent. Only 
Guinea chose independence. All the other TOMs adopted the first solution 
and had then to opt for one of the three following options: they could choose 
either legislative integration and thus become a DOM, or they could decide 
to become a State in free association with France, a solution adopted by all the 
African TOMs. This was a non-official but understood transitional and peaceful 
evolution towards independence. Or they could remain a TOM, characterised 
by their legislative specificity – the French Parliament had to stipulate if a law 
was (and still is) applicable to one, some, or all TOMs. Besides this legislative 
distinction, there were two other major differences between a DOM and a 
TOM. First, each TOM was given a tailor-made status that would take into 
account its characteristics and needs and allow some degree of autonomy,4 
reflected in the nature of its institutions and local powers. Second, the TOMs 
2 Law no. 46–451 19 March 1946.
3 Deforestation, illegal immigration, illegal exploitation of gold, are three examples of 
what Guyane, and especially its indigenous populations, continue to endure partly 
as a result of being given a status not specifically designed to allow Guyane to better 
address these issues. 
4 Although this degree of autonomy was seriously reduced in 1958 compared to what 
the 1956 Defferre Law had offered. See Mrgudovic (2005).
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were given the right of ‘free-determination’ as enshrined in the Preamble to the 
Constitution of 1958.5
By 1962, and after the wave of independence in Africa, 11 French overseas 
territories remained;6 four DOMs (Martinique, Guadeloupe, Guyane and 
Réunion) and seven TOMs: New-Caledonia, French Polynesia, Wallis and 
Futuna in the South Pacific, the Comoros Islands, French Somaliland,7 the 
TAAF (Terres australes et antarctiques françaises/Austral and Antarctic French 
Lands) in the Indian and Antarctic Oceans, and St Pierre et Miquelon in the 
North Atlantic.8 Finally, the common and important result was that these 
overseas populations had all become French citizens, with the same legal status 
as any other French citizen (i.e. from metropolitan France)9 and in due course 
as any other European citizen.10
Besides these two categories of overseas collectivities, recognised in the 
1958 Constitution, new statuses have developed since the 1970s. The Comoros 
Islands, as any TOM was entitled to, used its right to self-determination, held 
a referendum and gained its independence in 1975. However, of the four 
islands of the archipelago, Mayotte decided to remain French, and from then 
on it would never cease proclaiming its wish to become a DOM. In 1976 this 
island became a Collectivité Territoriale d’Outre-mer (CTOM), a status mid-
way between a DOM and a TOM, and so, in 1985, did St Pierre et Miquelon 
solely for economic reasons.11 New Caledonia and French Polynesia have also 
5 As yet another sign of France’s desire to distinguish itself from the rest of the world, 
the constitution’s preamble spoke of ‘libre-détermination’ (free-determination), as 
if it defiantly wanted to avoid using the official expression of ‘auto-détermination’ 
(‘self-determination’) used by the international community.
6 The year 1962 is selected, instead of 1958, because Wallis and Futuna had 
exceptionally remained a Protectorate until 1961 and, in 1962, was the last French 
possession to become a TOM. For an analysis of this delay, see Allison (2010).
7 Côte des Somalis, renamed the French Territory of the Afars and the Issas in 1967 
before its independence in 1977 when the name was changed to the Republic of 
Djibouti.
8 St Pierre et Miquelon, whose economy relied heavily on fisheries, saw its status 
changed over the years mainly because of the European fisheries policy. It became 
a DOM in 1976 and then, in 1985, a French Overseas Territorial Collectivité or 
CTOM, a hybrid status that allowed the FOT to keep all the benefits of integration 
while being exempt from the European fisheries regulations.
9 With regard to some social benefits, the populations from the FOTs and the DOMs, 
in particular, have not benefited automatically from the same level of benefits as 
their compatriots living in the metropole.
10 As implemented by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the Amsterdam Treaty of 
1997.
11 Mayotte has been requesting its ‘départementalisation’ since 1975 in order to secure 
its future within the French Republic for economic reasons, but also to be protected 
from the new Republic of Comoros that never accepted its secession. In the case 
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experimented with an evolution in their respective statuses as TOMs, gaining 
more and more autonomy from the late 1980s. However, this occurred in two 
totally different contexts: one through violence – in New Caledonia a near civil 
war erupted in the mid 1980s between pro- and anti-independence groups; 
the other, mostly due to political lobbying – the role and ambition of Gaston 
Flosse, who became the ‘President of French Polynesia’, was crucial in this. 
Because of these two different contexts, the statuses have led to two different 
perspectives: New Caledonia is now heading toward a referendum on self-
determination whereas French Polynesia is not.12
Concerning the DOMs, two important constitutional reforms were 
introduced in 2003 and 2008 that addressed the evolution of the ‘collectivités 
territoriales’ (or ‘territorial collectivity’), both overseas and in mainland France. 
A territorial collectivity, an elected local council, benefits from a certain degree 
of power in administering the collectivity in question. Initially, the 1958 French 
Constitution listed as territorial collectivities the communes (municipalities), 
départements (counties) and territoires d’outre-mer (overseas territories). In the 
first constitutional reform on decentralisation in 1982, the regions were then 
added to this list and granted specific powers.13 In 2003, the second phase of 
the reform on decentralisation impacted on both the TOMs and DOMs. The 
former were to be replaced by two categories: the collectivities with a specific 
status (collectivités à statut particulier, although New Caledonia was already 
designated as such since 1999) and the Overseas Collectivities (‘Collectivités 
d’Outre-Mer’ or COMs) covered by a reformulated Article 74 of the 
Constitution. The DOMs, covered by the revised Article 73, were encouraged 
to implement a simplification in their administration.
Although the reform of 2008 seemed more focused on the DOMs, the 
reforms or acts of 2003 and 2008 concerned all the FOTs (except New 
Caledonia which had a special status) and revolved around the key notions 
of self-determination and autonomy. The status of the now 12 FOTs14 has 
therefore evolved since 1958, as has the constitution. The principal object of 
this chapter will be to demonstrate that the recent constitutional or institutional 
developments in the FOTs highlight the fact that the relationship France has 
of St Pierre et Miquelon – TOM, then DOM – France changed its status again in 
order to avoid the strict fisheries policy developed by the European Community 
that applied to the DOMs (and all Outermost Regions).
12 Although New Caledonia’s situation and status is of course more complicated. See 
Mrgudovic (2003) and (2005).
13 A Département is in charge mainly of the social welfare issues, whereas the Région 
is more focused on economic and cultural development.
14 The Comoros is no longer a FOT, whereas St Martin and St Barthélemy became 
two new ones when they decided not to be administered any longer by Guadeloupe 
and became COMs.
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developed with its overseas territories since 1946 might well have reached a 
new level.
2000–3: decentralisation, phase 2
Besides reformulating Articles 73 and 74 of the constitution (concerning the 
FOTs), the second phase of decentralisation implemented in 2003 introduced 
a new element: the possibility for the FOTs to organise a local referendum that 
would lead to a change in their status. This is particularly interesting for the 
DOMs as they could consider a status of autonomy. However, in 2000, as a 
precursor to the second phase of decentralisation, such a possibility had already 
been open to the DOMs.
Self-determination in 2000: too early for the DOMs?
In 1997, Article 227-2 of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
had been amended in accordance with the Amsterdam Treaty of June 1997. In 
France, the award decree (décret d’attribution no. 97-721 of 16/06/1997) had 
then redefined the objectives of the Ministry for Overseas Territories as split 
between a mission of sovereignty development, on the one hand, and a mission 
of economic and social development, on the other. This is what inspired the 
Loi d’Orientation pour l’Outre-mer (LOOM) (Overseas Act) of 2000 (Faberon 
and Ziller, 2007: 59; Belorgey, 2002: 87–8; Mrgudovic, 2005). This Act had 
two objectives: to increase decentralisation, and to open up new perspectives of 
institutional evolution for the DOMs.
The second objective led to the creation, in each DOM,15 of an ad hoc 
consultative body, a Congrès, composed of all regional and departmental 
councillors that would meet to discuss the institutional evolution of the 
territory. They could adopt a proposal to be submitted to the Prime Minister 
who would then decide whether or not to submit it to Parliament. This 
institution would then pass a law (or not) to authorise a local referendum on 
the proposed new status, which could include independence.16 Whatever the 
result of this consultation, it is the Constitutional Council that would have 
(and still has) the last word on whether to adopt any proposed new status.
This LOOM was the first encouragement made to all DOMs to consider a 
change in their old and somewhat inappropriate status. In initiating the LOOM, 
the then Prime Minister, Socialist Lionel Jospin, in a time of cohabitation 
under Conservative President Chirac, had given the DOMs, for the first time 
since their creation, the possibility to consider some evolution in their status 
including independence (see below). However, this attempt drew a blank due 
to a combination of two factors: first, the slowness of local councillors to agree 
15 Réunion, however, would always refuse to consider any change to its status. 
16 Although this option is not very popular in the DOMs (Gay, 2003).
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upon a common proposal; and second, the objection of the populations of 
the DOMs to any change in their status which was perceived as a threat to 
the level of subventions received from the French State. Therefore, although 
in Martinique, for example, a pro-independence leader Alfred Marie-Jeanne 
has regularly been re-elected mayor, deputy and President of the Regional 
Council,17 independence was never the way forward for a large majority of 
Martinicans, for whom Marie-Jeanne’s personality and integrity were the main 
reasons for his popularity (see Yang-Ting, 2000). 
However, could the LOOM really have led to independence? Jurists such 
as Jean-Yves Faberon and Jacques Ziller did not consider independence as a 
possibility and, although they described the LOOM as a new perspective on 
the evolution of the DOMs’ institutions, they limited this evolution to Article 
73 (Faberon and Ziller, 2007: 60), i.e. with the exception of independence. 
I disagree, as Article 62 of the LOOM is very imprecise when it evokes ‘any 
proposal of institutional evolution’ without setting a limit (LOOM, 2000, Art. 
62). To me, this ‘loose’ formulation was intentional, as Prime Minister Jospin 
did not want to exclude the possibility of the DOMs considering independence 
(Mrgudovic, 2005). However, within such a perspective, there were two major 
obstacles to overcome: first, this proposal had to be supported by the Prime 
Minister, then by the Parliament, and finally endorsed by the Constitutional 
Council; and second and most importantly, the DOMs’ representatives did not 
react quickly enough to submit any kind of proposal before the forthcoming 
presidential elections, which, in a way, demonstrated their lack of enthusiasm 
for a change in status. However, later, in 2003, the victory of the conservatives 
at the 2002 presidential election led to some modifications to the LOOM and 
in particular clarified the possible options open to the DOMs. 
2003: decentralisation or recentralisation?
When the first reform on decentralisation was introduced in 1982, and with 
it the creation of the region as a new territorial collectivity, a problem emerged 
with regard to the DOMs. A region was supposed to geographically encompass 
a few départements. However, in the case of the DOMs, geography was one 
major problem in this division of duties and powers as the new overseas 
regions (ROMs or Régions d’Outre-Mer) were to gather under their umbrella 
only one department each. The Regional Council and the Departmental 
Council were therefore to share the same electorate and the same geography. 
The proposal to create for each of these four DOMs a single collectivity that 
would incorporate the responsibilities of the department and the region was 
17 Alfred Marie-Jeanne was the President of the Regional Council between 1998 and 
2010 and has been Député at the French National Assembly since 1997. He was 
also the Mayor of Rivière-Pilote between 1971 and 2000.
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rejected by the Constitutional Council for it was perceived as a violation of the 
principle of equality (with the metropolitan collectivities). This is why the four 
DOMs also had to become four ROMs (that in turn constituted four DROMs: 
Départements et Régions d’Outre-Mer). This new quite peculiar double status 
was in a way even more in contradiction with what existed in mainland France. 
This did not appear, however, to be the view of the Constitutional Council.
In 2003, the introduction of a second phase of the decentralisation policy 
established in 1982 led to changes to the French Constitution, particularly 
with regard to the Overseas Collectivities. This new Constitutional Reform 
on Decentralisation (to be applied at national level) aimed to create a better, 
more coherent, and more responsible administrative and political management 
of the regions, départements and municipalities. It was aimed at reorganising 
the FOTs into two new administrative categories. For this purpose, two ‘new’ 
Articles and a new Chapter were introduced into the constitution, dedicated 
to the ‘Overseas Collectivities’ (COMs) ruled by the new Article 74 (with 
a regime of autonomy and legislative specificity); the collectivities ruled by 
Article 73 (corresponding to the legislative identity of the DOMs-ROMs); 
and the collectivities with a special status (New Caledonia and Corsica). New 
Caledonia also benefited from a chapter in the constitution (chapter XII) 
entirely dedicated to its current status and its progressive evolution towards 
self-determination.
This reform also introduced the possibility of administrative ‘experimentation’ 
in two respects. First, the reform opened the possibility to all FOTs to swap 
status and adopt legislative identity (Article 73) or legislative specificity and 
autonomy (Article 74), although this second option differed from the previous 
TOM status as it did not give the right to hold a referendum on independence. 
This right had been solely maintained for the ‘old’ TOMs, French Polynesia, 
and Wallis and Futuna. It should be noted that New Caledonia had not been 
a TOM since 1999, its current status having been created to provide for and 
guarantee the best conditions to organise a referendum on self-determination 
(with the possibility of independence) between 2014 and 2018. Second, within 
Article 73, although the legislative identity that characterised the DROMs had 
been maintained, it was now possible to create a new Collectivité (with a new 
Council) to replace the department and the region (although this option was 
rejected by the Constitutional Council in 1982). Article 73 could also be used 
to create a single council while retaining the two collectivities (DOM and 
ROM).
Following this constitutional reform, councillors of Martinique and 
Guadeloupe submitted proposals and a referendum was organised in both 
DOMs, on 7 December 2003, to consider a single territorial collectivity. In both 
cases, the populations agreed with their councillors’ enthusiasm and rejected 
that possibility (in Martinique with 51 per cent and in Guadeloupe with 73 per 
cent). In Guyane the lack of consensus between the elected representatives did 
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not permit the organisation of such a referendum. Finally, in order to take into 
account the strong opposition of Réunion to any change to its status, a ‘third’ 
option had then to be considered for the DROMs, the status quo.
Although Martinicans and Guadeloupeans refused any change to their status 
(as did, in a way, Guyane and la Réunion), the two islands administered by 
Guadeloupe, St Martin and St Barthélemy, also had the opportunity to organise 
a referendum in December 2003, this being on whether to become a COM 
(Collectivité d’Outre-Mer). Being ruled by Article 74 meant ‘emancipation’ from 
Guadeloupe, to administer themselves and improve their economic development 
in an autonomous way. While St Martin wanted, among other things, to be able 
to tackle the problem of immigration from its Dutch neighbour Sint Maarten, St 
Barthélemy wanted to be able to manage, develop and benefit more directly from 
its lucrative tourist activities.18 The results in both islands were overwhelmingly 
in favour of the new status (76 per cent in St Martin and 96 per cent in St 
Barthélemy). The two organic Laws of 21 February 2007 recognised this change 
and established the new statuses, allowing the two new COMs to develop, for 
example, their own taxation policy in accordance with French Law. 
This reform has therefore empowered the DOMs, in particular, with the 
opportunity to be less dependent on the central authorities and entitled them 
to test their own capacities to initiate new means of political and economic 
development. If St Martin and St Barthélemy have been keen to embrace this 
opportunity, the ambiguous attitude of the four DOMs towards this option is 
far less understandable and might explain why the French government keeps 
trying to incite them in that direction.
The 2008 Reform: towards more autonomy?
The 2008 project of territorial reform introduced by President Nicolas Sarkozy, 
and adopted on 16 December 2010, concerns all territorial collectivities (regions, 
departments, municipalities), and aims at ‘simplifying’ the administration of 
the various types of collectivities, in mainland and overseas France. It considers 
the evolution of the DOMs, in particular, wishing to prevent dysfunctions 
such as damaging political rivalry between the regions and departments and 
their elected councils. President Sarkozy wanted the territorial collectivities and 
the DOMs, in particular, to gain more political and economic responsibility 
in order to promote good governance and also to generate more of their own 
incomes. As Sarkozy stated: ‘There is a strong aspiration for improvement that 
translates into the current claim for an endogenous economic model capable of 
generating incomes and local employment’ (Sarkozy, 2009).19
18 St Barthélemy is renowned for ‘jet set’ tourism.
19 ‘Il y a une aspiration puissante à un mieux être que traduit aujourd’hui la 
revendication d’un modèle économique endogène susceptible de favoriser la 
création de richesses et d’emplois locaux.’
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The socio-economic crisis in the DOMs
This ‘strong aspiration’ refers directly to the social crisis that erupted at the end 
of 2008 in Guadeloupe and spread to the rest of the DOMs over the ensuing 
few months20 in the context of a global economic crisis that had translated 
into yet another increase in the price of petrol (already higher in the FOTs 
due to the distribution monopolies that prevail there). It then developed into 
a protest movement against ‘la vie chère’ (the high cost of living) with the 
‘Alliance Against Profiteering’ (in creole: Lyannaj Kont Pwofitasyon  or LKP) 
becoming the driving force of the protest.21 The denunciation of the ‘colonial’ 
(in the sense of exploitative) economic system and price-making policy in 
Guadeloupe, and in the rest of the DOMs, led to massive strikes that lasted 
much longer than expected – 44 days in Guadeloupe, 38 days in Martinique, 
15 days in Guyane and eight days in Réunion. The LKP accused the richest 
families, usually descendants of colonial families, of holding and maintaining 
monopolies, with the silent support of the Republic, in the key economic 
sectors such as the import-export and the supermarket sectors in particular.22 
The notions of ‘pigmentocratie’ and ‘ethnoclasses’, often used by some prominent 
figures in local politics or literature to describe the situation in the French 
Antilles,23 underlay the LKP’s discourse.
After vigorous negotiations, the response of the government was first to 
agree upon a salary increment of €200 for those on low salaries in the public 
and private sectors, and also to organise the ‘États Généraux de l’Outre-Mer’: a 
general discussion, via the internet and local meetings, on Overseas Territories 
involving the populations and elected authorities of the FOTs and the rest of 
France. This was followed by the organisation of an Inter-Ministerial Committee 
on the Overseas Territories, a general meeting with President Sarkozy, the 
Ministers directly involved with the FOTs and local representatives and actors, 
to identify the sectors or issues, shared or specific to each FOT that needed 
reform or renewed support. The crisis, and the following États Généraux and 
Inter-ministerial Committee, reinforced the determination of the government 
to ‘encourage’ the FOTs to adopt a more coherent and responsible attitude 
towards their political, social and economic situation. 
The 2008 reform, first promoted in the DOMs, represents what President 
Sarkozy also wishes to achieve in mainland France. Therefore, as with 
20 On this crisis see my chapter, ‘Guadeloupe 2009: Issues politiques à une crise 
sociale?’ in Reno (2011). 
21 This movement brought together nearly 40 unions, political parties and movements.
22 In Martinique for instance the ‘Béké’ (white colonial rich) families own 52 per cent 
of the land and control 40 per cent of the economy, while representing only one per 
cent of the population.
23 The writer Raphaël Confiant and the President (socialist) of the Regional Council 
of Guadeloupe, Victorin Lurel
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Decentralisation in 1982, the DOMs could again appear as a sort of institutional 
laboratory for the Republic. This territorial reform must be implemented by 
the collectivities by 2014. This could explain the significant encouragement, 
presented as a response to the 2009 crisis, from the President (and the Ministry 
for Overseas Territories) to the DOMs to adopt, by January 2010, the status 
of Article 74, or at least prepare the implementation of article 73 according 
to the 2003 (and 2008) reforms on collectivities. While Martinique and 
Guyane decided upon a new single collectivity (and a single territorial council), 
Guadeloupe’s elected councillors are still debating the characteristics of a single 
‘Assembly’ and have submitted a Bill proposal to the National Assembly. In 
December 2010 the Parliament decided that, when the reform is implemented 
in 2014, Guadeloupe should have 45 councillors in one territorial Assembly. 
However, the current councillors are questioning the competences of this 
‘Territorial Assembly’ and its legality (as it should not be allowed to deliberate 
without the approval of the Guadeloupeans by referendum). The Bill also asks 
for an increase in the number of councillors to 65.24
Towards more responsibility
The main objectives of this reform are greater economic self-reliance and 
better governance (with greater political involvement of the populations). 
One indicator is the balance of trade, where imports largely outweigh exports, 
except in the case of New Caledonia (Thiou, 2010), and therefore there is a 
high level of dependency on funds from Paris (which reached €12.7 billion 
in 2009) (Performance Publique, 2010). The government considers that 
improved economic self-reliance could be achieved in part through the politics 
of regional integration of the FOTs. Promoted by France over the last decade, 
first in its South Pacific Territories, the government is now encouraging 
the rest of the FOTs to more economic insertion and regional cooperation, 
hence reinforcing their capabilities of endogenous economic development 
(and reducing their dependence on public funding). The États Généraux de 
l’Outre-Mer and the Comité Interministériel de l’Outre-mer represent important 
initiatives to encourage the DOMs in that direction. 
One could therefore summarise the reform of 2008, and the subsequent 
governmental initiatives, as an official attempt to put an end to the vicious 
cycle of dependency that can take two forms: a dependency cultivated by 
France and for France and the local elites to preserve economic control; 
and a dependency claimed by the overseas populations (as they do not want 
24 Bill proposal no. 3585 to adapt the reform on collectivity to Guadeloupe’s 
characterictics and constraints. Submitted by Victorin Lurel to the National 
Assembly on 22 June 2011, www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/propositions/
pion3585.asp (accessed 18 Jan. 2012)
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to give up a standard of living that has been kept artificially high). This 
dependency, in both forms, could explain the reluctance of the DOMs to 
move towards emancipation. This could also be illustrated by the fact that, 
with the new Article 73, the DOMs have been granted more freedom to 
adapt laws and regulations passed by the French Parliament, but in reality 
they have so far made very little use of this new power (Cointat and Frimat, 
2011b).
What framework for the evolution of the FOTs?
As for a possible simplification of statuses implied by the constitutional 
reforms of 2003 and 2008, this did not take place. Today there are as 
many statuses as there are FOTs: Réunion (DROM, Art.73);25 Mayotte (in 
evolution towards full integration, Art.73); Martinique; Guyane (Art. 73, 
soon to become two single collectivities,26 each of them managed by a single 
council); Guadeloupe (Art. 73, has opted to retain its two collectivities with 
one single council); St Pierre & Miquelon (Art. 74 with some adaptations); 
St Barthélemy and St Martin (two COMs Art. 74, new regime); French 
Polynesia and Wallis & Futuna (Art. 74 ‘old regime’ as they retain the 
possibility to ask for a referendum on self-determination that could include 
independence); the TAAF (still considered a TOM); and last New Caledonia 
(Special Collectivity).
Already in 2000, at the time of the first attempt to allow the DOMs to 
adapt or change their status, President Jacques Chirac had acknowledged that 
‘uniform statuses are over and each overseas collectivity should evolve, if it so 
wishes, toward a somehow tailored status’.27 Nicolas Sarkozy, following on from 
Chirac’s declaration of 2000, confirmed this in his speech of November 2009 
where he stated that ‘[t]he unity of the Republic does not imply a uniformity 
of its institutions’.28 He repeated it in his speech of January 2010 in Réunion: ‘I 
see nothing shocking in considering that each of the overseas territories would 
endorse an organisation adapted to its own characteristics as long as this does 
25 Réunion will remain a DROM Art.73, until the deadline of 2014 for the 
implementation of the 2008 general reform on collectivities (although the next 
President, if Sarkozy is not re-elected in 2012, could decide otherwise).
26 There is still no agreement on the date of this implementation. The year agreed 
upon for the rest of the collectivities is 2014, but 2012 is the government’s preferred 
date (i.e. before the presidential elections, which would complete the 2008 reform 
programme).
27 Jacques Chirac, (Martinique, 11 March 2000): ‘Les statuts uniformes ont vécu et 
chaque collectivité d’outre-mer doit pouvoir désormais, si elle le souhaite, évoluer 
vers un statut différencié, en quelque sorte un statut sur mesure’.
28 ‘L’unité de la République n’est pas l’uniformité de ses institutions.’
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not affect the principle of unity of the Republic.’29 Therefore, whatever the 
option chosen, a FOT under Article 73 or 74 could not evolve outside the 
Republic. In his speech in Réunion in January 2010, Sarkozy recalled to that 
effect, ‘[w]e have equipped ourselves with a Constitution that allows for great 
flexibility that I intend to use (...) with one red line (...) independence. The 
overseas territories are French and will remain French.’30 So is it correct to 
say that the FOTs are prisoners of the Republic? The populations and their 
representatives have, since 2000, demonstrated that independence is not 
the issue. Therefore such a declaration (by President Sarkozy) could appear 
needlessly conservative. Self-determination should be left accessible to all FOTs 
and not only to the old TOMs.
This right to self-determination, and the very large degree of autonomy 
enjoyed by the three French territories of the Pacific, does not however exclude 
a possible intervention of the state if it becomes necessary, as the situations 
in French Polynesia and New Caledonia recently illustrated. Indeed, French 
Polynesia’s ‘wide autonomy’ (as described in its status) has not helped to 
prevent a high level of political instability in the territory. Since its last status 
conferred in 2004 that granted Tahiti even more autonomy than the status it 
was given in 1996 (in external relations and in legislative power for example), 
the territory has experienced no fewer than 12 governments. This has been 
caused by governments with small majorities and a fractious, opportunistic 
and self-serving Parliament (Al Wardi, 2008). This is why Sarkozy in his New 
Year speech in January 2011 declared to the French Polynesian politicians that, 
although the intention was to give them a maximum of responsibilities, the 
state would not hesitate to intervene if the political situation got out of control 
and the local institutions failed to perform as they should. In response, in July 
2011, the Parliament amended the 2004 status of French Polynesia in order 
to regulate the use of the motion of no-confidence and therefore guarantee a 
more stable political, and consequently economic and social, situation in the 
archipelago (Quentin, 2011).
The necessary intervention of the State in the domestic policy of French 
Polynesia has highlighted the fragility of this ‘wide autonomy’. However this 
should not deter the rest of the FOTs from considering this option as the way 
forward even though the large choice of possible statuses is guaranteed by the 
constitution.
29 ‘Je ne vois pas ce qu’il y a de choquant à considérer que chaque territoire ultramarin 
puisse se doter d’une organisation adaptée à ses caractéristiques propres, à condition 
que cela ne remette pas en cause le principe d’unité de la République’. Sarkozy 
repeated this in a speech in Guadeloupe in January 2011.
30 ‘Nous nous sommes dotés d’une Constitution qui nous permet beaucoup 
de souplesse. Je compte en faire usage (…) avec une seule ligne rouge (…) 
l’indépendance. L’outre-mer est français et restera français’.
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New Caledonia and Mayotte: an evolving institutional spectrum 
for the FOTs
With its amendments of 1998 and 2008, the French Constitution now 
presents a large panel of possible options to accommodate the particular 
situation of each FOT within the Republic. The examples of New Caledonia 
and Mayotte present the two opposite situations characteristic of the new face 
of this ‘Overseas France’. One wants (or has agreed) to consider independence 
while the other has never stopped claiming more integration.
New Caledonia: on a rocky path to self-determination?
The Accords de Matignon-Oudinot, signed in 1988 to defuse the threat of 
civil war between the pro-independence Kanak31 and the loyalist Caldoches, 
organised a ten-year period of political, social, cultural and economic 
compensation (rééquilibrage) in favour of the Kanak, and was to end with a 
referendum on self-determination. However in 1998, both actors, with the 
agreement of the State, agreed in the Nouméa Accord that, in order to securely 
construct a ‘shared future’ (un avenir commun), a further period of 15 to 20 
years was needed. This new agreement was established to further experiment 
with and then consolidate the elements of a ‘shared sovereignty’32 with a 
progressive and definitive handing over of most political, administrative and 
legislative powers from the State to the territory’s authorities. However, the 
State would retain its five ‘pouvoirs régaliens’ or ‘sovereign powers’ (defence, 
foreign policy, currency, justice and public order) until the next referendum. 
As set out in the Nouméa Agreement, the Parliament of New Caledonia 
(the Congrès) must, before 2014, set a date for the referendum on self-
determination some time between 2014 and 2018. The citizens of New 
Caledonia33 will then decide whether to maintain – and the form this will 
take – their relations with France. They will have to decide on the transfer of 
the five ‘pouvoirs régaliens’ to New Caledonia, which in turn will impact on 
the organisation of citizenship, nationality and international status.34
31 The Melanesian Kanak population represent about 40 per cent of the total 
population (250,000) of New Caledonia, while the Caldoches (the European 
descendants of the colons and convicts established in New Caledonia since the 
1850s), together with most of the rest of the population, today represent the 
majority and are generally opposed to independence.
32 Preamble, Nouméa Accord, 1998.
33 Those who voted in the referendum in 1988, and those who reach 18 in the 
meantime, will be entitled to take part in this referendum on self-determination. 
This is another demonstration of the will of the French state as well as of the major 
actors in New Caledonia to allow the Kanak population, or more exactly the pro-
independence Caledonians, to express their will in the most favourable conditions.
34 Article 5, Nouméa Accord 1998.
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Since 1998, the population and authorities of New Caledonia have been 
encouraged to develop their own attributes of sovereignty (motto, anthem, 
bank notes and flag) (Nouméa Accord, 1998). In April 2008, a motto was 
officially announced: ‘Land of word, land of sharing’ (‘Terre de parole, terre 
de partage’), as well as an anthem ‘Let us be united, let us become brothers’ 
(‘Soyons unis, devenons frères’).35 Later that year, the national Conseil d’État 
recognised the validity of these two markers of identity (signes identitaires) and, 
in August 2010, the Congrès of New Caledonia voted to endorse the motto, the 
anthem and the proposals regarding the design of the bank notes. However, 
in 2011, New Caledonia was shaken from within its own government when 
the then President Philippe Gomes opposed flying the pro-independence flag 
of the independentist group FLNKS (Socialist and Kanak Front of National 
Liberation) alongside the national flag, claiming this was in opposition to the 
spirit of the Nouméa Accords and a threat to the political stability established 
by the Matignon and Nouméa Accords (Cointat and Frimat), 2011b: 11–12). 
The display of the two flags had, however, become commonplace since 1988 
(even in non-independentist towns with the exception of La Foa, Moindou and 
Bourail), and this had also become common practice in French Polynesia since 
1984 without causing any significant opposition. This controversy resulted 
in the resignations of two political groups (first the pro-independence Union 
Calédonienne, then Gomes’ loyalist Calédonie Ensemble) from the coalition 
government. But it was the three successive resignations from government 
of the President’s own group that clearly appeared to be a deliberate act 
intended to provoke an early general election by overthrowing the Congrès 
(the institution that constitutes the heart of Caledonian politics). This was 
the first time this political tool (the collective demission of a group within the 
government), established in the Organic Law that implemented the Nouméa 
Accord, was deliberately used to block Caledonian institutions and threatened 
to jeopardise the so-far rather peaceful process towards self-determination. 
Exceptionally, the Congrès then decided to ask the State (and Parliament) to 
amend the article in the organic law that concerned the collective demission 
of part of the government, in order to prevent an abuse of this instrument in 
the future and therefore guarantee the return of a peaceful and stable political 
transition towards the referendum on self-determination.36
It is surprising that such an event took place at the initiative of the 
President and his political group when, as was well known at the time, pro-
France voters constituted the majority of the electorate in New Caledonia. This 
can be explained by the growing division amongst loyalist groups and some of 
their leaders who, in a more peaceful context (in front of pro-independence 
35 Several proposals were considered for the bank notes.
36 A delay of 18 months between two possible collective resignations has now been 
introduced to the Organic Law of 1999.
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representatives entirely focused on the quest for the best option for a sovereign 
New Caledonia), have let personal ambitions prevail over the general interest. 
Since Gomes’ eviction from power previous President Harold Martin (loyalist) 
has been re-installed in his position as President of the government. More open 
and more respected across the whole political spectrum, his return might be a 
guarantee of stability although, as the pressure increases with the referendum 
deadline approaching, violence could erupt again.
Mayotte: a ‘DOM’ at last!
After more than 30 years, the small island of Mayotte, in the Indian Ocean, 
finally managed to obtain what it had been claiming since its secession from 
the Comoros islands in 1975. Mayotte, initially autonomous (when it was part 
of the TOM of French Comoros) became an ‘Overseas Territorial Collectivity’ 
in 1976 and an ‘Overseas Departmental Collectivity’ in 2000, despite Mayotte 
having claimed to be ‘assimilated’ in the French Republic since 1975. France 
therefore appears to have created these special statuses to accommodate a 
request it did not want to satisfy. These French citizens had been asking for 
a referendum on ‘self-determination’ to opt for the opposite option than the 
one usually associated with this sort of referendum. After nearly 30 years of 
‘hesitation’, France eventually agreed to hold two referenda in Mayotte, the 
first in 2000 on the status of CDOM37 being a preparatory stage of the second 
held in 2009 on self-determination.38
The outcome was an overwhelming majority (96 per cent) in favour of 
Article 73 (and legislative identity). The long reluctance of France to undergo 
this statutory change could be explained by the fact that Mayotte is 98 per cent 
Muslim and its population’s fluency in French is not what one would expect 
from a French territory. The people of Mayotte have always enjoyed ‘special 
treatment’ particularly when it comes to language and secularism. Two main 
languages are spoken there alongside French, which often remains relegated to 
schools, administration and the media. Besides, Mayotte was ruled by Islamic 
religious law until 2011,39 an exception to the secular rule in the Republic that 
could have been accommodated in the status of a TOM or even a CTOM 
(and their legislative specificity), but not any longer under a regime based on 
legislative identity with mainland France. Therefore, from 2000, the common 
law had to be extended progressively to this territory’s population. The delay 
37 In CDOM and CTOM the C stands for ‘Collectivity’.
38 In 2000, 73 per cent of the Mahorese declared themselves in favour of the new 
status that was supposed to facilitate their move towards ‘départementalisation’ and, 
in 2009, 96 per cent of the Mahoreses decided to become the ‘Département de 
Mayotte’.
39 Although some changes, such as banning polygamy, have been progressively 
introduced since 2000 in preparation for the likelihood of integration. 
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in acceding to Mayotte’s wish could also be understood in terms of France not 
wanting to provoke the Comoros, who continue to oppose the secession of 
Mayotte and are very active in expressing their view, and the UN, which never 
endorsed France’s decision to split the result of the referendum of 1975 between 
the four islands.
In March 2011 Mayotte became the 101st French Département, although 
it is not per se a DOM as it has become (ahead of any others) a new ‘single 
collectivity’ ruled by Article 73. Designated as ‘Le département de Mayotte’, 
its combined competences are those of a département and of a region managed 
by a single council. Despite its new status, it will not immediately enjoy all 
the social and economic benefits given to the rest of the DOMs. The French 
central authorities can put forward two main reasons for the 25-year delay. 
First, Mayotte’s economic situation is challenged by a series of impediments 
such as a very young and fast-growing population (200,000 and counting) and 
a very low generated income (mainly from horticulture). Second, progressive 
‘départementalisation’ was carried out in an attempt to limit the extremely high 
level of immigration mostly from the neighbouring Comoros islands. To raise 
the level of public financial support immediately would have subjected Mayotte 
to an even higher level of illegal immigration, jeopardising Mayotte’s chance of 
a successful transition. This is why full social and economic advantages will be 
granted progressively so as to allow the Mahorese to adapt to the major cultural 
and economic changes they will now have to face.40
Finally, a last point concerning the FOTs’ change of statuses is the 
impact these alterations will have on their European status. For example, St 
Barthélemy and St Martin’s adoption of a status that allows more autonomy 
has also led to a change in their European treatment. In January 2012, St 
Barthélemy is scheduled to give up its outermost region status to enter the 
OCTs category (Overseas Countries and Territories). This means reduced 
financial support from Europe, but also less constraint. On the other hand, 
Mayotte in becoming a DOM should soon see its European status ‘upgraded’ 
from OCT to an outermost region in 2014.
Conclusion
Despite ‘encouragement’ from the French government and the President, 
autonomy does not seem to be an attractive option for the populations of 
the DOMs, who have repeatedly demonstrated their preference for the status 
quo. The referenda of 2003 and 2008 could be described as failed attempts 
to simplify the overseas statuses. But is this what matters? In point of fact, 
the efficiency and dynamism of the local leaders and of the populations is 
what is really at stake. In the former TOMs, now COMs, self-determination, 
40 See Mrgudovic (2005) for a more detailed report on this situation.
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a right maintained for French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna, does not 
seem to be the main concern of the populations. Even in French Polynesia, 
the political instability that has been present since 2004 does not incline 
the population to claim independence, nor even more autonomy, but rather 
a better managed ‘country’.41 This claim is therefore aimed more at local 
politicians in the overseas territories, rather than at the French State, and is 
not at the institutional level but at the political one. Lastly, New Caledonia, 
the territory with the strongest claim for independence, seems to become more 
and more hesitant and cautious. If we simply consider the figures, there is no 
means by which independence could ever be a democratic option. However, 
to guarantee peace and development the pro-independence component of 
the population and its various political representatives have to be recognised 
and granted power based not on figures but on principles and ideals. This is 
what was sought with the status of 1988 and 1999. These encompass dignity, 
the ability of all Caledonians to decide for themselves on their destiny and 
the degree of association they want with France. This last point will largely 
depend on their ability to support themselves financially. And that is exactly 
the policy President Sarkozy has tried to develop in the rest of the FOTs as well, 
with one nuance however: they will have to develop their financial autonomy 
while remaining within the boundaries of the République. If the latter does 
not seem to cause much concern, the former might prove more challenging to 
establish. But it will require patience, determination (from the overseas elected 
representatives) and courage (from most of the FOTs populations) to recognise 
that eventually autonomy will be the only way forward for the FOTs.
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